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Towards a Social Contract for Genomics:  
Property and the Public in The ‘Biotrust’ Model 
 




Large-scale genetics cohort studies that link genotypic and phenotypic information 
hold special promise for clinical medicine, but they demand long-term investment and 
enduring trust from human research participants. Currently, there are a handful of 
large-scale studies that aim to succeed where others have failed, seeking to generate 
significant private-sector investment while preserving long-term interest and trust of 
studied communities.  With project planners looking for new modes of managing such 
complex collective endeavors, the idea of using a charitable trust structure for 
genomic biobanks has received increasing scholarly and policy attention. This article 
clarifies how thorny questions around property rights, the right to withdraw from 
research, access to materials, and funding might be handled within such a charitable 





Large-scale genetics cohort studies that link genotypic and phenotypic information 
hold special promise for clinical medicine, but they demand long-term investment and 
enduring trust from human research participants.  Recent experience in the United 
States, the UK, Iceland, Estonia, and Sweden suggests that population-level genomic 
studies pose particularly difficult legal and ethical challenges.1  Indeed, many 
population genomics projects with great scientific promise have failed due to 
unanticipated controversies over the distribution of property rights, data access, risk, 
and benefits across different project interest groups – such as researchers, human 
subjects, funders, medical institutions and private sector partners.2  Currently, there 
are a handful of large-scale studies that aim to succeed where others have failed, 
seeking to generate significant private-sector investment while preserving long-term 
interest and trust of studied communities.   
 
With project planners looking for alternative governance models for genomic 
biobanks, the idea of using a charitable trust structure – as proposed in a 2003 New 
England Journal of Medicine article by Winickoff and Winickoff3 – has received 
increasing scholarly and policy attention.4  This literature has highlighted the potential 
strengths of using charitable trust law to create an ideal institutional framework, but 
has also identified potential problems that may hinder its implementation.  Addressing 
these questions directly, this article clarifies and develops this “Biotrust Model” with 
respect to key areas of implementation, including property rights, the right to 
withdraw from research, access to materials, and funding.  The Biotrust Model and its 
treatment of property interests, as explicated in this article, remains a promising 
framework for community-driven governance in many genomic contexts. 
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I.  Theoretical background: towards a new social contract for genetic biobanks 
 
As Winickoff and Winickoff have argued elsewhere, charitable trust law may be a 
useful legal and institutional tool for implementing a partnership relationship between 
biomedical researchers and research subjects in the genomic biobanking context.5  
This idea was a response to a stream of empirical work suggesting how the existing 
regime of research governance has failed to manage large genomic programs.6  These 
programs have co-emerged with new scientific approaches, new technologies, and a 
new political economy of research, all of which have helped unsettle the existing 
regime of research governance in particular ways.  These are worth reviewing.  
 
First, as others have pointed out, DNA sequencing technology and bioinformatics 
have effectively transformed human tissue into a newly decipherable source of 
personal health information that uniquely identifies individuals.  As a result, the tissue 
or blood sample has become equivalent, in privacy terms, to personal data in a 
medical record that can be digitized and shared across computer networks, and used to 
discriminate.   
 
Second, it is a characteristic of DNA that sequences are shared across family and 
ethnic groups.  This group turn carries important consequences for research ethics and 
institutional design.  Sequence data derived from one person’s sample can implicate 
close family members.7  Furthermore, research on a particular ethnic group or group 
of common geographical ancestry – such as those groups studied in the human 
haplotype projects – implicates all members of that group whether they participate 
directly in the research or not.8  This fact disrupts the pre-existing ethical paradigm of 
research subjects as distinct autonomous individuals, introducing important notions of 
group autonomy and solidarity that have emerged with force in recent population 
genomic projects.9 
 
Third, and less noted, the creation of large genomic assemblages – often incorporating 
human tissue, medical information, and genealogical information -- for unforeseen 
research protocols has distanced genomics from the paradigm of research for which 
informed consent and IRB review was specifically tailored.  In the past, research 
involving human subjects has been limited in time, and defined for a specific 
scientific study.  Expanding the time-scale and openness of research use poses 
problems for achieving meaningful informed consent.10 
 
Fourth, the new role of the private sector in these projects, and an increasing emphasis 
on property, has destabilized understandings between human research participants and 
academic researchers.  Traditionally, this relationship involved the exchange of 
altruistic donation of time, bodily tissue, and medical information from human 
subjects in return for possible biomedical progress with general benefit.11  However, 
the growing role of private industry in biomedical research and discovery has 
introduced property, profit and distributional struggles into the equation. Furthermore, 
the commodification of biological information12 has raised new controversies around 
intellectual property, rights in samples, and scientific control.13 
 
These trends make the design of an appropriate regulatory regime and institutional 
structure for genomic biobanks a novel challenge.  Together they highlight how 
genomic research is not only a complex scientific endeavor, but also a complex social 
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one.  The off-the-rack regime of bioethics will no longer suffice, and instead we must 
rethink the processes and structures through which the affected communities and the 
public may deliberate upon, constitute, and enforce a new social contract for genomic 
research. 
 
II.  The Biotrust Model: clarifying the legal and institutional structure 
 
The sustainability of large-cohort genomics will require institutional, procedural, and 
substantive legitimacy in order to secure ongoing funding, a progressive research 
program, and the willing participation of volunteer subjects over time.  Using 
traditional informed consent and expert ethical review as a foundation, the Biotrust 
Model attempts to address these novel challenges by focusing new attention on issues 
of governance, constitutional powers, control of resources, and public benefit. The 
Biotrust Model aims to create a flexible institutional space through which the social 
contract around particular projects may be negotiated, ratified, and implemented.  The 
hope is that the idea can be adapted and provide utility for new genomic projects as 
they emerge, especially projects attempting to implement innovative strategies for 
managing genomic resources for public benefit. 
 
The Biotrust Model consists of a legal structure for handling the property rights and 
management of donated genetic and informational resources, and a social structure 
aimed at bolstering community participation, representation and trust in genomic 
governance – necessary conditions for sustainable collaborations.  Because there has 
been some confusion and misstatement of how this model could operate, we believe it 
would be useful to clarify the model and respond directly to productive criticisms that 
have emerged regarding its operation.  
 
The core idea of the Biotrust Model is to use the charitable trust as a legal framework 
to manage genomic resources and to govern genomic research more justly.14  A trust is 
a formal legal institution in which a property interest is held by one person or set of 
persons (the trustees) at the request of another (the settlor) for the benefit of a third 
party (the beneficiary).15  The property interest is conveyed to the trustee in a trust 
instrument that must clearly express the wish to create a trust. The settlor appoints a 
trustee of the property, who has legal fiduciary duties to keep or use the property for 
the beneficiary, creating a unique protective regime of trust law for safeguarding the 
interests of donors and other beneficiaries.16  The creation of a trust establishes a 
fiduciary relationship in which a trustee holds title to property, subject to an equitable 
obligation to keep or use the property for the benefit of the beneficiary.17   
 
To be classified as a charitable trust, the purpose must be “charitable” and aim at the 
public good.18  Courts have defined “charitable” broadly in order to encourage 
“experiments to which it would be improper to devote the public funds or that the 
public would be unwilling to support until convinced by proof of their success.”19  
Allocating benefits of the trust to specific groups rather than general public might be 
desired in certain biobanking situations because of the composition of the donor 
group, because of some heightened need of a particular segment of the public, or 
because research results may be relevant only to a small section of the public.  
Directing benefit to certain segments of the public would not jeopardize charitable 
status of a trust.  In fact, at least in the Anglo-American tradition, the charitable 
classification of trusts requires that the purpose involve benefiting a class of persons 
and not simply the community at large.20  
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The charitable trust model combines a series of individual trust instruments, in which 
donors give certain property interests to the same trustee, the Biotrust Foundation, a 
non-profit organization that holds and manages the biorepository in accordance with 
the stated charitable purpose.  The charitable trust structure would put a legally 
binding fiduciary obligation on the trustee to faithfully manage the resource according 
to the charitable purpose and the public benefit defined in the trust instrument.  This 
fiduciary duty forbids trustees from self-dealing with the trust assets, engaging in 
conflict of interest transactions, and entering into transactions adverse to the trust.21  
The Biotrust Foundation would be managed according to its by-laws, which the 
donors would also agree to, and which define the charitable purpose and the terms of 
public benefit.  Procedural details could be changed according to the needs of the 
foundation’s goals, by amending its by-laws.  
 
The Biotrust Model adds important governance mechanisms to this basic charitable 
trust framework.  In this model, the by-laws would specify that use of the trust 
property would be contingent on review and approval of two bodies, the Ethical 
Review Committee (ERC) and the Donor Advisory Committee (DAC).22  The ERC of 
the biorepository would provide peer review and ethical analysis of research protocols 
that call for access to biobank materials. This committee would be roughly equivalent 
to an Institutional Review Board (IRB), except that it would be more directly 
responsive to the collective interests of the donor group.  Ideally, it would involve a 
significant number of donors so as to be more representative of the research subject 
population than current regulations require, at least in the United States.23 
 
The Donor Advisory Committee would be a body composed of direct representatives 
of the donor group, and this group would help assure that the public value of the 
collected charitable donations would be maximized.  This body would approve 
research protocols, but would also serve as a conduit between the donor group, the 
trustees, and the researchers in order to address controversial projects or issues as they 
arise.  The DAC would provide an important democratic element to the governance of 
the trust, but is envisioned also as a flexible mechanism through which 
communication and learning could take place among the biobank constituents.  In the 
United States, a similar body has emerged out of the Framingham Heart Study in 
Massachusetts, an ongoing study of fifty years in which the subject group has taken an 
interest and role in project decision-making.24  These representative could be elected 
periodically through proxy voting, in a process akin to the election of board members 
by shareholders of a corporation. 
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III.  Response to criticisms  
 
Critics in Europe and the UK have highlighted certain advantages of this model.  
First, it respects the altruistic intent of donors, while ensuring that their goodwill is 
not exploited.  Second, it imposes a duty on the resource managers to make the 
resource productive.  Third, fiduciary law addresses a power imbalance between the 
settlor/beneficiaries and the trustee, in contrast to the consent model, which has often 
been criticized for failing to take into account the power imbalance between doctor 
and patient.25  Fourth, the separation of storage and usage reduces the conflicts of 
interest in making prioritization decisions about the resource, enhances the 
opportunity for ethical review, and encourages interest groups to participate in 
decision-making.26  Fifth, the procedural mechanisms and structures are likely to help 
mediate among diverse interests implicated by the research.  Other advantages in 
terms of transparency, donor representation, autonomy, and scientific utility are 
discussed in the original article, and need not be rehearsed here.27 
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Recent scholarship has also raised important concerns with the legal architecture of 
the charitable trust model.  This criticism, especially that of Boggio,28 has been 
helpful as an analytical spur towards better specifying and clarifying how the model 
could be useful.  Here we discuss the significant issues for genomic governance raised 
by Boggio and others, and explain how the charitable trust model could be designed to 
resolve them. 
 
A.  Property rights of biological samples 
 
One concern Boggio raises is that the charitable trust idea fails to answer important 
questions concerning ownership of tissue samples, derived data, and the database 
itself.  Boggio notes that “property in the body” is ethically controversial and legally 
inadmissible in certain jurisdictions, and this might make the model incompatible with 
many legal systems to the extent that it requires a formal recognition of property in 
the body. The question of ownership of samples is a thorny one, and it is important to 
clarify why establishing the charitable trust would violate neither the spirit nor the 
letter of this prohibition. 
 
As a threshold issue, it should be pointed out that the charitable trust model does not 
require the formal recognition of “property in the body,” at least not as that phrase is 
normally understood. The rejection of “property in the body” in certain jurisdictions 
limits the free alienability of bodily entities integral to personhood, and is based on 
the visceral and ethical disdain for commodification of the human body.29   However, 
recognizing the existence of property-like interests in human tissue is not tantamount 
to endorsing a full spectrum of alienable property rights, for example the right to sell 
tissue at any time for cash compensation. As one commentator has put it, 
 
. . . the equation of any property right with the full spectrum results 
in the erroneous impression that recognizing the existence of 
property rights in human tissue is tantamount to endorsing a right to 
sell any body party, at any time, for cash compensation . . . . A richer 
and more complete understanding of property rights, however, 
emphasizes the tremendous variety of possible property regimes in 
human biological materials.  Property is a flexible concept, not an 
all-or-nothing one.30 
 
The creation of a charitable trust would not require a general property right in the 
body, but something much narrower: the recognition that personal rights of control, 
and use, and access in pieces that can be extracted without harm (indisputably held by 
the person prior to donation) may form the basis of a legal trust.31  
 
In fact, the charitable trust is a legal tool for effecting this norm of non-
commodification.  The structure relies on the recognition of a property-like interest in 
donated materials only for the narrow purposes of creating an enforceable trust 
relationship, one that embeds control of tissue in a managed network of non-
commodity exchange: samples must be used according to the terms of the trust, and 
the trustee enforces this use.  Furthermore, the donor retains some control over the use 
of the donation because she can withdraw according to the trust agreement.  Using a 
revocable trust relationship actually ensures that donors retain an equitable interest in 
their donation, suggesting a sort of joint control with the trust (see below).32  This 
joint control of the donation does not defeat the ability to create a trust.  Here the land 
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analogy helps: a person can give a mortgaged property to be held in trust even though 
they do not own a complete inalienable right to that property. 
 
Within some jurisdictions, such as the United States, body parts are already 
understood as subject to “property interests” or “quasi-property” in certain contexts, 
especially where the bodily materials are not integral to the person’s health and 
functioning.33  The idea of a limited or quasi-property right actually comports with the 
WHO Regional Office report that Boggio cites, recommending that participants in 
biomedical research should have the “primary control [of] samples or the information 
generates from them,” and that their legal interest “is akin to a property right.”34  In 
these jurisdictions, all that is required to create a trust is that donors transfer these 
rights to the charitable trust.  
 
Boggio is also concerned that the charitable trust model is in conflict with policies 
that provide that the donation of the tissue sample does not transfer property in the 
sample to the recipient, noting that the “Icelandic Acts on Biobanks explicitly 
provides that the biobanker is not to be considered the owner of the biological 
sample.”35  We would like to draw a distinction between ownership, which suggests 
the full and undivided bundle of rights associated with property, and possessing 
certain property interests.  As Harvard property scholar Joseph Singer puts it, “the 
core image of ownership is ownership of a home.  The core conception is the notion 
of absolute control; ownership is the ability to do what you like with your own, 
without having to account to anyone else for your actions.”36  If ownership implies 
absolute control and complete freedom to use, access, sell without account to others, 
than the trustees can’t be said to “own” the samples under the charitable trust model.  
We imagine a so-called “donor-advised trust,” in which the materials are actually co-
managed by donors, trustees, and the sitting ethics board in accordance to the 
charitable intent of the donors.  In this sense, the trustee actively holds many of the 
traditional “sticks” in the bundle of rights associated with property except the right to 
sell freely. These include rights granting access, use, and control, but only for certain 
limited purposes set out in the trust purpose and by-laws.  Furthermore, the donors 
retain the ability to enforce those limitations through participatory governance and the 
right to revoke the gift.37  Thus, this system is specifically designed to address the 
ethical, legal and social problems associated with the free alienation of bodily 
materials: instead of allowing donated materials to disappear into the unaccountable 
vortex of “research” or the market exchange, the charitable trust actually 
institutionalizes the connection between body part and person.   
 
In practice, to use the “no property in the body” idea to deny research donors the 
ability to put these materials in a charitable trust would achieve the perverse result of 
facilitating their commodification.  Whether the law recognizes this fact or not, 
biological samples have become commodified in the political economy of genetics 
research.38  The Biotrust Model proposes a way to govern and regulate the exchange 
of bodily material in order to mitigate some of the concerns that are presented in 
either a system of complete ownership or complete lack of ownership.  Indeed, this 
institutional model is specifically designed to render the exchange of human research 
materials more accountable to the donors and more consistent with their charitable 
intent.   
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B.  Property rights in derived data and databases 
 
Dealing with derived data and databasing from a property perspective are less difficult 
to address.  If the charitable trust institution itself performs research and in the process 
derives data from peoples’ donations, then that data is clearly controlled by the trust 
itself, and would then have to be managed by the trustee according to the charitable 
purpose and by laws of the trust.  The database itself, if constructed by the Biotrust 
Foundation, will also be owned and controlled by the trust itself.  This accords with 
the typical treatment of data and research tools created through research.  
 
Of course, commercial entities that use donated research material to conduct research 
have a legitimate interest in the fruit of their labor.39  If the trustees decide to grant 
outside researchers or companies access to particular data or samples, and those 
research entities construct their own electronic database, ownership of this database 
would be negotiated in the licensing agreement between the trust and those 
researchers.  However, based on the charitable trust model the researchers would 
never have complete ownership of the research material.  For example, the research 
material could not be used for some alternative research that is different from the 
original research protocol approved by the trust’s Ethical Review Committee and the 
Donor Advisory Committee.  The flexible nature of the model allows the Biotrust 
Foundation’s bylaws to determine the interest that commercial entities have over the 
research material.  Therefore, the procedural details about the right for commercial 
entities to access and use research material will vary depending on the charitable goals 
and by-laws of the Biotrust Foundation. 
 
C.   Managing access to samples and information 
 
As the previous sections suggest, the Biotrust Model assigns the role of managing 
access to the board of trustees, although in our Biotrust Model they are constrained by 
the Ethical Review Committee (ERC), Donor Advisory Committee (DAC) and donor 
rights of withdrawal (described below).  This much has been discussed briefly 
elsewhere.40  Boggio correctly points out, however, that our structure does not specify 
how access to samples and sensitive data will be managed by the trustees.  He raises a 
series of questions that will help us clarify how a charitable biotrust might be 
implemented. 
 
First, Boggio notes that the charitable trust structure does not answer whether and 
how external research groups will access samples, data derived from them, and/or 
sensitive health information collected along with samples.  It is true that a charitable 
trust structure by itself does not provide an answer.  But this fact provides flexibility 
that is actually a strength of the legal structure.41  It will be up to the project 
organizers, donor group, and board of trustees to develop acceptable by-laws for the 
trust that may dictate guidelines for the degree of access.  We would suggest that these 
be negotiated before the architecture is set up, perhaps through a process of public 
consultation,42 but the by-laws could be written to permit later refinement in the 
interest of pragmatism.  These by-laws, negotiated before hand and refined later, 
should also address any principles of prioritization as between commercial and 
academic protocols, another open issue Boggio has raised. 
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If past experience is any judge, researchers in both the commercial and non-profit 
sectors will likely ask for access to biological samples, DNA sequence information, 
and any data that the charitable trust might hold.  However, recall that under our 
biotrust model, the protocol and any commercial deals would have to be approved not 
only by the trustees, but also by the ERC and the DAC.  Furthermore, access would be 
limited by any statutory or regulatory requirements.  Privacy rules and human 
research protections in many countries will likely prevent the transfer of identifiers 
along with samples and health information, at least without individual authorization.43  
 
Finally, Boggio asks whether participants would be informed if research findings 
might affect their individual care.  This is an important issue, but one that can be dealt 
with through the individual donor agreements with the trust.  In the interest of 
enhancing the autonomy of individual donors, and potential direct benefits of the 
research, we would agree with previous commentators that donors be able to indicate 
on the consent form – by checking a box – if they would like to be recontacted (so 
long as identifiers still allow it) in therapeutic situation.44  Recontact could be pursued 
through the donor’s primary care physician.  
 
Boggio states that “in the end, the trustees will be asked to make these sorts of 
judgments in adopting the policies that regulate third-party access.  Most of the 
answers will only lie in those rules governing the biobank and its contractual relations 
with external actors rather than in the governance framework.”45  While this could be 
true if the trust instrument gives trustees control, the choices of managers can be 
constrained and regulated in a number of ways.  Additionally, we have suggested a set 
of policies to help guide the thinking of project planners as they consider how they 
might accomplish different access goals through the by-laws of the trust. 
 
D.  Implementing the right of withdrawal 
 
As we have discussed elsewhere, a charitable trust in the biorepository context must 
make special accommodation for research participants, allowing them to be able to 
withdraw their samples from the biobank at any time.46  Boggio raises the question of 
whether a revocable charitable trust is able to effectuate this right of withdrawal. 
 
First, the right to withdraw one’s samples from the charitable biorepository needs to 
be distinguished from the opt-out window, another mechanism previously described 
through which the so-called “open consent” problem is mitigated.  For efficiency 
reasons, most biobanks seek an open permission from donors at a single point in time 
for future research projects instead of recontacting and reconsenting donors when new 
protocols arrive.  These so-called “open consents” pose problems for traditional 
notions of informed consent, which require that the research participant understand 
the risks and benefits of particular research protocols. Stanford University bioethicist 
Henry T. Greely and others have argued persuasively that biobanks’ requests for 
general permission should be allowed only if additional safeguards are in place.47    
 
The “opt-out window” is a mechanism that increases the autonomy of research 
subjects who give open permission, for it allows the donors to review particular 
protocols and gives them a time-limited window in which to opt-out of that particular 
protocol.   This mechanism honors the traditional norm of granting research subjects 
the right to withdraw from particular research project, while not overburdening the 
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biobank with recontact and reconsent.  Through electronic newsletters, normal mail, 
and a web site, the biotrust foundation would convey information to donors, allowing 
donors to make informed decisions about withdrawing from specific research projects 
for a short period of time before the research begins. 
 
Second, the revocable charitable trust is indeed a mechanism that could effectuate the 
right to withdraw one’s sample from the biobank at will or in cases of non-adherence 
of trustees to the charitable purpose.  A revocable trust is a trust that allows the settlor 
to revoke the trust property, according to the terms of the trust instrument.  Boggio 
states that “technically it is not a ‘revocable’ trust because in this case, the withdrawal 
of biological material of a single settler/donor does not revoke the whole trust.”48  It is 
incorrect as a matter of law that the creation of a revocable trust relationship between 
individual donors and a single trustee would require that if one donor withdraws, the 
entire biobank be revoked.  For instance, if one made a conditional donation of land to 
a charitable trust, say the National Land Trust, and the conditions were not met, the 
property would revert to the donor without interfering with trust’s other obligations.  
While legal partnerships might embody this “all-for-one-one-for-all” idea, revocable 
trusts do not.  The key conceptual point is that people donate into the existing trust, 
but under certain conditions, such that the Biotrust Foundation has individual 
revocable trust relationships with each donor. 
 
Individual revocable trust relationships are ideal for implementing the Biotrust Model 
that we advocate for biobanks. In a revocable trust the settlor maintains equitable 
rights in the trust property, though the trustee holds legal title. If a trust is not 
revocable the settlor usually has no equitable claim to enforce the terms of the trust or 
to terminate the trust.49  Most jurisdictions assume that a trust is revocable unless the 
trust instrument indicates otherwise.  
 
Another concern Boggio raises is the status of the donated material at the individual 
donor’s death.  One simple solution is for charitable biotrusts to allow for individual 
variations in the trust instruments that indicate the settlor’s desire upon death.  For 
example, settlors could indicate that they want the donation destroyed at their death or 
they could indicate that they want the sample permanently donated without any 
restriction.  
 
The trust bylaws and individual trust instruments would set the policy for withdrawal.  
As Boggio states, withdrawal might entail a number of actions, such as returning 
samples to the participants, destroying samples, anonymization, removing identifying 
information, destroying genetic data derived from the sample or simply no longer use 
them.  There are some concerns about allowing donors to withdraw from scientific 
research at any point because scientist may not want to invest in research that could 
possibly be terminated or damaged by a withdrawal.  Pragmatism requires that once a 
research project is started, the donor would not have the ability to withdraw from that 
specific study.  But at any time the donor could completely withdrawal their material 
from any future research.    
 
Creating a revocable trust ensures that donors maintain the legal rights necessary to 
withdraw their donation and enforce the duties of the trustees. In this way, the 
revocable status of donations helps advance the representation, deliberation, and 
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accountability of researchers to the donors, which is appropriate in research using 
biological material and information.   
 
E.   Funding 
 
As stated in previous work, initial funding for a Biotrust should be committed in the 
public interest by state or charitable donors, and experience indicates that state 
governments, medical charities, and even particular disease groups may be willing 
seed such an entity.50  The key benefit of the charitable trust is that the collection must 
be managed for public benefit.  However, some relationship with the private sector 
may be desirable to promote research and to funnel money back to support the trust 
infrastructure.  Once the charitable biotrust foundation is started it will likely sustain 
itself by charging reasonable fees for access to cover operation expenses. 
Furthermore, depending on the goals of the charitable trust, the biotrust foundation 
could contract for intellectual property rights in the research. 
 
Boggio has stated that the Winickoff & Winickoff model insufficiently details how it 
could balance openness and public-benefit with commercial collaboration.51  Boggio 
is correct that the Biotrust idea by itself says little about how an appropriate balance 
should be struck between maintaining open access and encouraging private 
collaboration.  The optimal balance cannot be prescribed, but will have to be worked 
out in practice.  The fact is, there are various ways that charitable biotrusts could 
strike this balance, depending on the goals and purposes of biotrust and its donors.  
 
Managing the public-private interface in genomics in a way that is acceptable to those 
involved may be one of the greatest challenges facing these endeavors.  A key strength 
of the Biotrust Model lies in its governance architecture -- in which power is shared 
across the board of trustees, donor representatives, and the ethics committee.  In its 
ideal form, this architecture would help foster a Habermasian space52 for public 
deliberation and learning not only about the use and operation of the biobank, but also 
about the new genetics and its effect on the political economy of health.  Joint 
governance creates the potential ability to deliberate policies regarding the private 
sector.  We imagine that the donor representatives will be in contact with the donor 
community through newsletters, public hearings and comment periods.  These efforts 
may be useful to achieve pragmatic policies, so long as they are ratified by the 
community. 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
 
Biomedical research has shifted meanings with the advent of new genetic 
technologies and an expanded role for the private sector.  Large genomic assemblages 
embody these changes, but they retain a strong public character and mandate due to 
the collective demands of this type of research.  The ongoing project to construct a 
genomic governance that acceptably orders the interface between public and private 
will likely fail until we reconceive genomics as an enterprise driven not by profit, but 
by collective political will.  The Biotrust Model attempts to create a framework for 
this reconception.  It is an attempt to create a vigorous public space through which a 
new social contract for biomedical research may be negotiated and ratified. At the 
same time, it seeks the elusive balance between respecting the dignity of human 
persons and generating public value, a balance that has been unsettled by the new 
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modalities of biological science, technology, and property.  In order to accomplish 
these tasks, it constructs a hybrid legal identity for genomic resources, one that stakes 
out a position between personhood and property, gift and commodity, group and 
individual, public and private.  Its merit, if it has any, will be measured not by its 
theoretical novelty, but by its practical ability to open pathways of democratic 
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